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UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
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                        Argued August 2, 1995 
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(Opinion Filed November 28, 1995) 
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OPINION OF THE COURT 
                     
 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
 This Petition for Writ of Mandamus raises the delicate 
and difficult issue of judicial disqualification.  Petitioner, 
Sam Antar, is the defendant in a civil action brought by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC").  He is also the 
father of Eddie and Mitchell Antar, who were convicted of 
conspiracy to commit securities and mail fraud.  On appeal, the 
sons' convictions were overturned and the district judge was 
disqualified because of a statement of purpose made by the 
district judge which we found to be at odds with the judge's 
constitutionally mandated goal of ensuring fair trial.  United 
States v. Antar, 53 F.3d 568 (3d. Cir. 1995) ("Antar II").  In 
the course of the criminal proceedings, the district judge also 
remarked on the involvement in the conspiracy of the Antar family 
as a whole and of Sam Antar in particular.   
 The same judge who presided over the criminal 
proceedings now presides over the SEC action.  SEC v. Antar, 
Civil No. 93-3988 (D.N.J.).  Sam Antar has filed this petition 
seeking to have the district judge removed from that action.   
 We must determine what effect the earlier recusal 
should have on our resolution of the present petition--
particularly when that recusal is considered along with 
additional comments by the judge on family involvement in the 
conspiracy.  We concluded in the criminal action that the judge 
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had created an appearance of prejudice toward Eddie Antar and 
members of the Antar family, an appearance manifested by a 
statement which a "reasonable observer" would interpret as 
indicating that the judge had the goal in the criminal trial of 
recovering substantial funds from Eddie and Mitchell Antar. Antar 
II, 53 F.3d at 577.  In light of this earlier holding, considered 
together with the judge's further comments, we conclude that 
disqualification is also required in the closely related SEC 
proceeding against Antar family members, a proceeding which 
similarly seeks to recover substantial funds from the Antar 
family.  
I. 
 In our consideration of this petition for mandamus, we 
will focus on only a small portion of the facts surrounding the 
"decades-long rise and fall of an electronics retail chain called 
Crazy Eddie."  Id. at 570.  According to the government's 
allegations, the Crazy Eddie saga involved a sophisticated 
family-run conspiracy that netted its principals millions of 
dollars through a series of fraudulent misrepresentations and 
financial disclosures that duped the general public into 
investing heavily in the company.  See id. at 570-71.  Against 
this background, we focus on our decision in Antar II and the 
comments of the district judge.   
 In the criminal action, the government had obtained 
convictions against Eddie and Mitchell Antar, the two leading 
players in the Crazy Eddie epic.  In Antar II, we overturned 
their convictions and remanded the case for a new trial, finding 
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that the district judge had improperly failed to recuse himself 
because of an appearance of bias.  Id. at 579.  The principal 
defendant in the SEC civil suit and the petitioner in the matter 
before us is Sam Antar, the father of Eddie and Mitchell Antar.1 
The SEC charges Sam Antar with a variety of acts relating to his 
participation in the alleged Crazy Eddie conspiracy, making the 
underlying factual background indistinguishable from Antar II.   
 Sam Antar argues that this appearance of impermissible 
judicial bias that tainted his sons' convictions also forces the 
same judge's recusal from the SEC action.  The evidence of bias 
consists of the judge's comments on the record in the criminal 
proceedings. 
 First, Sam Antar relies on statements made by the judge 
in a hearing on the disposition of money posted during the 
criminal proceeding for Mitchell Antar's bail.  United States v. 
Mitchell Antar, Crim. No. 92-347 (D.N.J. Sept. 22, 1994) ("Antar 
I").  Following his criminal conviction, Mitchell Antar was 
sentenced to four years incarceration and ordered to pay 
$3,000,000 in restitution.  At the September 22 hearing, the 
district judge considered whether the trustee/receiver, 
overseeing the restitution, could execute on the $50,000 that had 
been posted as bail for Mitchell Antar.  Sam Antar opposed the 
trustee's efforts, claiming an ownership interest in the fund and 
                                                           
1
 Sam Antar is joined in his petition by co-defendants 
Allen Antar and Benjamin Kuszer, and by eight other family 
members named as relief defendants.  These additional defendants 
raise no additional arguments or grounds for relief.  For 
simplicity, we will refer only to petitioner, Sam Antar. 
4 
arguing that he was not involved in the conspiracy.  The judge 
declined to rule at that time on Sam's rights to the bail money. 
 We reproduce the relevant colloquy: 
THE COURT: . . . I realize there is a little delay on your 
part.  I understand there will be a delay--perhaps 
a delay of a month or two or six.  You may or may 
not prevail ultimately.  But I'm not going to pick 
this thing apart piece by piece or make little 
discrete pieces.  All part of one puzzle.  When 
the puzzle is together, I'll decide. 
 
COUNSEL:  It is just frustrating to me because [Sam Antar], 
my client, was not part of the majority of the 
proceedings that has been before this Court.  We 
are a latecomer to the proceeding. 
 
THE COURT: Right now he's being charged with certain activity 
relative to the Crazy Eddie stock in connection 
with the SEC proceeding.  So he is part of it. 
Moreover, there was testimony in the record, 
whether the statute of limitations has run or not, 
about his carrying millions of dollars across the 
sea to Israel strapped to his body, and what-have-
you.  There are all sorts of things. 
 
  Sam does not come in here with a halo on his head 
based upon the testimony I heard in this case.  I 
can't close my eyes to it or put blinkers on.  Sam 
is not some innocent bystander.  The innocent 
bystanders laying out there are the public.  The 
public are the innocent bystanders.  Not the Antar 
family.  No one in the Antar family was an 
innocent bystander.  That is what I'm saying. 
 
  So until we unravel the portions of the puzzle, I 
think the discrete issue here is execution.  That 
is the discrete issue.  In connection with the 
execution, when there has been full discovery to 
the execution, I'll decide who gets the money and 
who doesn't get the money. 
 
  I'm concerned.  I don't want this money withheld 
from [Sam Antar] if it belongs to him. 
Notwithstanding my previous comments.  I want to 
give everybody what they're entitled to, but we're 
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not playing three-card Monte on Broad Street or 
Broadway, New York.  This is not a three-card 
Monte game.  This is not a shell game.  This is 
the law.  This is a legal proceeding.  Before we 
do anything, I want it all out on the table. 
 
COUNSEL:  Your Honor, I need to state for the record some of 
your statements concerning Petitioner having gone 
before this Court I'll not answer now.  That date 
will come whenever that date is. 
THE COURT: I'm telling you what the testimony was by his 
brother.  His brother testified to that. 
 
COUNSEL:  I accept your statements your Honor. 
 
THE COURT: I haven't made a factual finding on it.  I'm 
telling you the Court is aware, having sat through 
the trial, that his brother got on the stand and 
testified.  His nephew got on the stand and 
testified. 
 
  These were things which were said about your 
clients.  Your client obviously was not a party to 
that proceeding.  He did not have to respond to 
that proceeding.  What I'm saying to you is this 
Court cannot put blinkers on and say I never heard 
that.  I heard it.  If I hear it, I know there is 
a lot of interrelationships between these people 
and a lot of money floating around.  I just want 
to make sure when I give money back I give it back 
properly in accordance with all the facts.  You 
may win.  I'm not saying you'll not win. 
 
  I'm not prejudging this in the least.  I'm saying 
fundamental fairness. 
 
Antar I, Transcript of Proceedings at 20-23 (D.N.J. Sept. 22, 
1994).  Sam Antar alleges that these comments create the 
appearance that the judge had predetermined the scope of Sam's 
involvement in the Crazy Eddie saga, based on evidence heard in 
the prosecutions of Eddie and Mitchell Antar. 
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 Second, Sam Antar relies on the statement made by the 
judge in the course of sentencing Eddie Antar:  "My object in 
this case from day one has always been to get back to the public 
that which was taken from it as a result of the fraudulent 
activities of this defendant and others."  53 F.3d at 573.  In 
Antar II, we held this statement dispositive in overturning the 
convictions of Eddie and Mitchell Antar, finding that it created 
the appearance of prejudice.  Id. at 576.  Although the statement 
pertained to Eddie directly, we also reversed the conviction of 
Mitchell Antar because 
we cannot distinguish reasonably between Eddie and 
Mitchell in this respect, as they were charged with 
offenses arising from the same circumstances. 
Furthermore, the judge indicated that he intended to 
recover what 'this defendant,' meaning Eddie, and 
'others' had taken by fraudulent activities.  Clearly, 
Mitchell was among the others. 
Id. at 579.  Sam Antar alleges that as Eddie and Mitchell's 
father, he is among the "others," making the judge's  statement 
of purpose applicable to him as well. 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction over a Petition for Writ of 
Mandamus under the authority conferred upon us by the All Writs 
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a).  Although we are justifiably hesitant 
in granting writs of mandamus, see In re School Asbestos Litig., 
977 F.2d 764, 772 (3d Cir. 1992), it is the settled law of this 
circuit that mandamus "is a proper means for this court to review 
a district court's refusal to recuse from a case pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 455(a)."  Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc., 10 F.3d 
155, 163 (3d Cir. 1993); see generally School Asbestos, 977 F.2d 
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at 774-78 (discussing relevant precedent, judicial procedure, and 
policy implications).  Where, as here, a party has made a 
challenge to the judge's failure to recuse, we review the judge's 
decision to hear the case on an abuse of discretion standard. 
Antar II, 53 F.3d 568, 573 (3d Cir. 1995); United States v. 
Dalfonso, 707 F.2d 757, 760 (3d Cir. 1983). 
 Because we seek to protect the public's confidence in 
the judiciary, our inquiry focuses not on whether the judge 
actually harbored subjective bias, but rather on whether the 
record, viewed objectively, reasonably supports the appearance of 
prejudice or bias.  Antar II, 53 F.3d at 574; United States v. 
Bertoli, 40 F.3d 1384, 1412 (3d Cir. 1994); Alexander, 10 F.3d at 
162; Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 98, (3d Cir. 
1992).  In making this determination, we remain ever mindful that 
attacks on a judge's impartiality may mask attempts to circumvent 
that judge's anticipated adverse decision.  Alexander, 10 F.3d at 
162.  We are also cognizant that our rulings in these matters 
keenly affect the conduct of judges and parties in all disputed 
matters before the district courts.  Bertoli, 40 F.3d at 1414; 
Dalfonso, 707 F.2d at 761.  Accordingly, we undertake with 
caution the "sensitive question of assessing all the facts and 
circumstances in order to determine whether the failure to 
disqualify was an abuse of sound judicial discretion." Alexander, 
10 F.3d at 162. 
III. 
 Sam Antar appears to invoke the broadest of the federal 
recusal provisions, 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).  He fails to mention any 
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other statutory basis for disqualification, such as the specific 
conditions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 455(b).  Moreover, we have 
previously determined that mandamus is not a proper method for us 
to review a challenge under the other federal recusal statute, 28 
U.S.C. § 144.  In re School Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d 764, 776 
(3d Cir. 1992); Green v. Murphy, 259 F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1958) (in 
banc).  For these reasons, we will analyze this case under 
§455(a). 
 Section 455(a) imposes a general duty on a federal 
judge to recuse whenever there is an appearance of judicial 
partiality:  "Any justice, judge, or magistrate of the United 
States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his 
impartiality might reasonably be questioned."  28 U.S.C. §455(a).  
The Supreme Court most recently addressed the application of this 
provision in Liteky v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 
1147 (1994).  We have subsequently interpreted and applied the 
provision in Blanche Road Corp. v. Bensalem Township, 57 F.3d 253 
(3d. Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 1995 WL 500513 (Oct. 10, 
1995), Antar II, 53 F.3d 568 (3d Cir. 1995), and United States v. 
Bertoli, 40 F.3d 1384 (3d Cir. 1994).  These precedents guide our 
inquiry. 
 In Liteky, the Supreme Court made clear that the 
ultimate issue for recusal is the appearance of a wrongful or 
inappropriate bias or prejudice.  114 S.Ct. at 1157.  The Court 
stressed the importance of the extrajudicial source doctrine in 
assessing a judge's unfavorable disposition toward a litigant. 
Although the Court provided a lengthy discussion of that 
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doctrine's significance, the Court ultimately concluded that the 
extrajudicial source is not outcome determinative.  The most 
critical factor is not the source of the judge's prejudicial 
knowledge or bias, but rather the judge's "inability to render 
fair judgment."  Id. at 1155.  
 Justice Kennedy in his concurrence in Liteky stated the 
same principle, but from a different point of view, that of a 
judge abiding by his oath:  "Judges, if faithful to their oath, 
approach every aspect of each case with a neutral and objective 
disposition."  Id. at 1160. 
 We find that our decision in Antar II controls the 
application of this principle to the petition before us.  We 
determined in Antar II that the judge's statement as to his 
"object in this case from day one" revealed a goal that "was 
something other than what it should have been and, indeed, was 
improper."  53 F.3d at 576.  This indicates that the judge's 
purpose was at odds with his judicially mandated responsibility 
to provide a fair trial and impartial forum for the litigants 
before him.  See Haines, 975 F.2d at 98 ("The right to trial by 
an impartial judge 'is a basic requirement of due process.'") 
(quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)).  The comment 
therefore manifested an improper bias or prejudice against Eddie 
and Mitchell Antar and "others" in the family.  We reject out of 
hand the contention that Sam Antar might not be one of these 
"others." 
 This same improper bias or prejudice against the Antar 
family is relevant to the SEC proceeding.  The SEC is asking that 
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the Antars be required to disgorge funds gained through the 
securities fraud conspiracy.  We conclude therefore that the 
district judge's comments rise to the level of "wrongful" bias 
and require his disqualification in the SEC proceeding.  The 
comment we made in reversing the criminal conviction has a 
similar bearing to the SEC action: 
It is difficult to imagine a starker example 
of when opinions formed during the course of 
judicial proceedings display a high degree of 
antagonism against a criminal defendant. 
After all, the best way to effectuate the 
district judge's goal would have been to 
ensure that the government got as free a road 
as possible towards a conviction, which then 
would give the judge the requisite leverage 
to order a large amount of restitution. 
53 F.3d at 576.   
 When the district judge announced that his goal in the 
criminal action was to recover for the investing public the funds 
which they had lost through the Antars' schemes, he also created 
the appearance that he had allied himself with the SEC in the 
civil action.   The judge "display[ed] a deep-seated favoritism 
or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible."  Liteky, 
114 S.Ct. at 1157; Bertoli, 40 F.3d at 1412 (quoting Liteky).   
 In reaching this result, we need not debate alternative 
characterizations of the judge's comments nor quibble over 
whether his opinions were based on extrajudicial or judicial 
sources.  Taken together, his statement of purpose in Eddie 
Antar's sentencing hearing and his comments on Sam Antar in 
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Mitchell Antar's bail proceeding create an appearance of bias 
that meets the required thresholds in both character and degree.2 
  It suffices to say that on the facts before us, our precedents 
require recusal. 
IV. 
 For these reasons, we will grant the Petition for Writ 
of Mandamus, requiring that further proceedings in SEC v. Antar, 
Civil No. 93-3988, be held before a different district judge to 
be selected by the Chief Judge of the District of New Jersey. 
                                                           
2
 We expressly decline to consider whether, absent our 
determination in Antar II that Judge Politan must be disqualified 
because of his statement at the sentencing hearing, we would draw 
the same conclusion from the statements in Mitchell Antar's bail 
proceeding alone.   
